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Abstract: Despite the rapid modernization of the Chinese countryside, informal institutions have remained influential for villagers' lives. While lineage is known as an 
important informal institution, its influence on rural socio-economic wellbeing is under-researched. Two conceptualizations exist to study lineage; lineage is used as a social 
network, which is used as a hierarchical organization or patriarchal clan system. This article compares these two conceptualizations in the analysis of a lineage's influence 
on villagers' contribution to irrigation infrastructure management. In times where formal institutions in rural China have weakened, this article questions how much lineage 
has taken over some of the functions of formal institutions, such as infrastructure management. Based on a survey in Sichuan Province, the results show that lineage takes 
effect as both an organization and a social network. 
 





With rapid economic change, rural China has become 
a "traditional modern society" [1]. Despite rapid 
modernization, households' decision-making is still 
affected by traditional culture and informal institutions. 
Instances of modernization are, for example, the quick 
urbanization in China and the related out-migration of 
farmers and their families, which reached 286.52 million 
people by 2017. In addition, the industrialization of 
villages and the related marketization, as well as social 
polarization, are indications of the modernization of the 
Chinese countryside. However, the influence of informal 
institutions has remained somewhat strong [2]. So far, 
literature on rural China has paid attention to the influence 
of informal institutions of relationship networks, such as 
guanxi, trust [3], or mianzi, "losing face", on household 
decision-making. Lineage culture and its influence on 
households' decision-making have not yet received enough 
attention. In times where formal institutions in rural China 
have weakened, lineage can somewhat take over some of 
the functions of formal institutions, as it contributes to 
cooperative behavior and local collective action [3]. This 
paper makes the case that for the collective task of 
irrigation in particular, in circumstances of weak formal 
institutions, informal institutions can have a positive effect 
on the provision of rural irrigation infrastructures [3, 4]. 
Lineage is considered one of the most important 
informal institutions in rural China [5-7]. How to analyze 
lineage is by no means evident, as it comprises both 
horizontal and vertical structures. Therefore, two different 
conceptualizations have been used to study lineage. Some 
studies understand lineage as a kind of social network [8], 
and other studies conceive it as an organization [5]. Social 
networks can be rather open structures, where hierarchies 
are less distinct and can be bridged by network ties. They 
can thus be very efficient structures to facilitate collective 
action. Lineage as an organization, foremost, can be 
understood as being more hierarchical and closed. For 
lineage as an organization to bring about collective action, 
"organizational identity" can be considered important. 
"Organizational identity" is a kind of social identity, which 
forms through kinship and makes members identify with 
their lineage group, leading to strong cohesion. Social 
identity can also facilitate collective action [9]. So far, the 
implications of these different conceptualizations of 
lineage have not been examined. If future research is to 
examine the effect of lineage on collective action in rural 
China, it is important to know which conceptualization 
would be appropriate to use. Alternatively, formulated 
differently, what exactly within lineage triggers farmers' 
willingness to contribute to collective action-lineage as a 
social network or lineage as an organization? The aim of 
this paper is to address this knowledge gap using concepts 
of irrigation infrastructure management in rural China. 
In this study, this article considered irrigation 
infrastructures. Chinese local governments and village 
collective organizations are responsible for public tasks 
like water management. The main financial source for rural 
public services came from agricultural taxes and fees, 
before the "agricultural tax abolition" policy in 2006 cut off 
these sources. The policy significantly increased farmers' 
income from agricultural operations [10], but it also 
weakened local governments when pursuing their public 
tasks, such as providing and managing irrigation 
infrastructures. "The provision and management of 
physical infrastructures necessary to utilize the resource 
(water) is a collective action problem in irrigation systems 
governance" [11]. Small irrigation infrastructures require 
collective management as they include e.g. canals, gate 
valves, air valves, pumps, motors, wells and electronic 
control equipment, which are jointly used by farmers. 
Small irrigation infrastructures were often not well 
managed after 2006, and especially small reservoirs, canals 
and pump stations were seriously damaged in rural China, 
which is why the effect of lineage on collective 
management is empirically interesting and relevant. 
In the following, we provide a theoretical framework 
and research hypotheses with regard to how lineage as 
social network and lineage as an organization need to be 
conceived for their empirical analysis. The third section 
introduces methodology and data analysis. The fourth 
section provides regression results. In the fifth section, we 
discuss the effects of lineage networks and lineage 
organization for the case of small-scale irrigation 
infrastructures. The final section provides a conclusion 
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with recommendations for further research on lineage and 
collective action in rural China. 
 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH 
HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Definition of Lineage 
 
Reforms in the modern history of China have often 
considered lineage to be part of a backward culture. During 
the Cultural Revolution, important artefacts of lineage like 
lineage of a clan's ancestral hall and genealogy were 
destroyed. Nevertheless, lineage has remained an 
important informal institution until today. 
Lineage members are born into their lineage that can 
be distinguished based on surnames. Traditionally, lineage 
members have strong lineage identity, the social and 
geographic structure of rural China can be summarized as 
"a pattern of difference sequence" [15], which means that 
relationships in the countryside were determined by clan 
members' status within lineage kinship. 
In the following, we introduce to how lineage has been 
conceived differently as an organization and as a social 
network, and derive hypotheses for our empirical research. 
 
2.2 Lineage as Social Network and Its Role for Collective 
Action 
 
The literature in recent years has defined lineage as a 
social network [6]; "Lineage networks are a distinctive and 
prominent feature of Chinese village life", where ancestry 
is the basis of the relationships between lineage members. 
Lineage networks are a kind of social network. The 
literature on social networks focuses on the analysis of the 
relationships between individuals, structures, and the 
influenced individuals' behavior [12]. Collaboration is 
more likely to occur in well-connected networks, or, stated 
differently, the strength of ties in social networks is 
important for collective action. Social networks with 
strong ties decrease the risks and costs of working together, 
which can facilitate collective action. 
From the above, this article derived the following 
hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: The strength of lineage network ties has 
a positive effect on households' participation in the 
collective action of irrigation infrastructure management. 
Hypothesis 2: The strength of lineage network ties has 
a positive effect on households' willingness to participate 
in the collective action of irrigation infrastructure 
management. 
This article makes a distinction between two 
dependent variables, namely, households' willingness to 
participate and households' participation. The reason for 
this is that willingness may be an indicator that respondents 
think they would have to answer because they are members 
of a lineage network (i.e., the variable could instead 
indicate a socially desired response). How much the 
strength of lineage networks leads to actual behavior will 
then be measured by hypothesis 1. 
 
2.3 Lineage as an Organization 
 
Lineage as an organization can be thought of as a 
pyramid structure, where the lineage leader is at the top, 
followed by the sub-leaders. Patriarchal clan systems have 
many more criteria to differentiate hierarchies within the 
clan. Seniority and age play an important role, where 
seniority relates to the number of generations in a clan. If 
two lineage leaders are of the same age, the lineage of the 
older clan has a higher status. For the research at hand, this 
article will not go further into depth about these norms, but 
this article will maintain the conclusion that they show 
lineage as a somewhat hierarchical system, where lineage 
leaders are responsible to call upon members for activities 
that are important to the clan. To measure lineage as an 
organization, "organizational identity" was used as an 
indicator. Organizational identity is a particular form of 
social identity [13]. Social identity enhances the 
probability of collective action [14] by means of cognitive 
mechanisms [15]. In addition, within organizations, social 
identity encourages members to participate in collective 
action [16]. Identity within an organization is said to 
enhance support and commitment to the organization [17]. 
A high organizational identity can facilitate individuals in 
contributing to collective goals [18, 19]. Organizational 
identity hence refers to what members perceive, feel, and 
think about their organization, which is assumed to be a 
collective, commonly-shared understanding of the 
organization's distinctive values and characteristics [15]. 
This article argues that lineage members have feelings of, 
for example, belongingness and identification with their 
lineage organization or clan, and that if research wants to 
understand lineage as an organization, "organizational 
identity" can help us to find out how far identification with 
the clan can enhance willingness to participate in collective 
action, or de facto collective action. 
From the above, this article derives the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: Lineage organizational identity has a 
positive effect on households' participation in the collective 
action of irrigation infrastructure management. 
Hypothesis 4: Lineage organizational identity has a 
positive effect on households' willingness to participate in 




3.1 Data Sources and Description 
3.1.1 Data Sources 
 
The dataset is from a survey that was organized by the 
last author in Jintang County in the city of Chengdu, 
Sichuan Province, China. Sichuan Province is located in 
the Southwest of China and is a good place to conduct this 
research as lineage culture is in general still rather intact. 
Jintang County is located northeast of the Chengdu Plain, 
28 km from the center of Chengdu. It is located in the third 
of the three circles that make Chengdu, i.e. in the outskirts 
of Chengdu and an area that both keeps traditional lineage 
culture and is influenced by factors of rapid economic 
development and out-migration. Jintang County is 
comprised of 21 townships, three of them are completely 
urbanized, which is why for the survey, villages were 
selected from the 18 townships. For each of these 
townships, 2 - 3 villages were selected, based on the 
information of experienced local government staff 
regarding which villages would have a lot of small 
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irrigation infrastructures. We randomly selected household 
heads as respondents, and determined the number of 
households by the ratio of one ten thousandth of the 
population of the township, the distribution of samples 
across townships ranged between 3.28% - 7.66% of the 
whole sample. The survey was conducted in August 2018. 
Jintang County is located in a monsoon-influenced humid 
subtropical climate, which means that farmers carry out 
agricultural production, and need small irrigation 
infrastructures accordingly, throughout the year. Survey 
questions with regard to whether respondents recently 
contributed to the provision of irrigation infrastructures 
hence could be validly answered, ranged between 3.28% 
and 7.66% of the whole sample. The survey was conducted 
in August 2018. 
 
3.1.2 Data Description 
 
The survey was conducted in August 2018, and the 
investigators were divided into three groups so as to 
conduct the survey simultaneously. There were 617 
questionnaires that were filled in, the sample consisted of 
548 valid questionnaires, and the effective response rate 
was 88.82%. Of the respondents, 66.61% were male, and 
the age group that officially comprised the labor force, 
namely, between 21 - 60 years old, accounted for 66.97%. 
This article uses the head of the household's education level 
as a proxy for the household's education level; 45.26% of 
the heads of households had a primary school education or 
below, 33.03% graduated from junior middle school. 
Technical secondary/high school degrees accounted for 
15.15%, and 6.20% of the heads of households had a 
college degree or an even higher educational degree. Heads 
of households living in the village for less than 20 years 
accounted for only 5.66%, while 10.58% of the heads of 
household had been living in the village for between 20 and 
39 years, 49.82% had been living in the village for 40 to 59 
years, and 14.78% had been living in the village for more 
than 60 years. Heads of households who were party 
members accounted for 33.94%, and 96.35% were 
registered as rural citizens, i.e., had a rural Hukou, while 
3.65% had an urban Hukou. Of the respondents, 62.77% of 
the households had 0 - 1 member who had out-migrated, 
33.03% had 2 - 3, and 4.20% had 4 - 12 members who had 
out-migrated. For household labor engaged in agricultural 
production, 39.78% of households had 0 - 1 laborer 
working in agriculture, 47.99% had 2 - 3, and 12.23 % had 




Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Item Category Quantity Percentage Item Category Quantity Percentage 
Gender Male 365 66.61 Education level 
Primary school and 
below 
248 45.26 
 Female 183 33.39  




Age of 16 - 
20 
13 2.37  
Technical secondary / 
high school 
83 15.15 
 Age 21 - 40 68 12.41  College 34 6.20 
 Age 41 - 60 299 54.56  Master /PhD 2 0.36 
 
Over the age 
of 60 














422 77.01  Over 60 years 186 33.94 
Households' Hukou 
Urban Hukou 20 3.65 
Labor out-migrated (no.) 
0 - 1 344 62.77 
Rural Hukou 528 96.35 2 - 3 181 33.03 
Willingness to participate in 
collective irrigation 
management 
1 - 1.75 35 6.39 4 - 6 23 4.20 
2 - 2.75 37 6.75 Household labor engaged 
in agricultural production 
(no.) 
0 - 1 218 39.78 
3 - 3.75 98 17.88 2 - 3 263 47.99 
4 - 5 388 70.80 4 - 12 67 12.23 
 
Relationship with villagers 
(see Tab. 4) 
 
1 0 0 Participation in collective 
irrigation management 
Yes 257 46.90 
2 1 0.18 No 291 53.10 
3 44 8.03 
Total income (see Tab. 4) 
 
1 62 11.31 
4 128 23.36 2 171 31.20 
5 375 68.43 3 142 25.91 
Agricultural income (see 
Tab. 4) 
 
1 481 87.77 4 81 14.78 
2 57 10.40 5 39 7.12 
3 6 1.09 6 53 9.67 
4 2 0.36     
5 1 0.18     
6 1 0.18     
Total number  548  Total number  548  
3.2 Independent Variables and Dependent Variables 
 
Two dependent variables were used, namely, lineage 
members' actual participation in collective irrigation 
infrastructure management (Y1) and lineage members' 
willingness to participate in collective irrigation 
infrastructure management (Y2). The dependent variable, 
Y1, was measured by asking the following question: "Did 
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you participate in collective action of managing small 
irrigation infrastructure during the last 1 year (both by 
contributing labor or money)?". The answer categories 
were "yes" or "no". Responses were fairly equally spread 
across these two answer categories. 
The dependent variable, Y2, was measured by 
providing four statements concerning respondents' 
willingness to contribute to irrigation infrastructure 
management (see Tab. 2). Farmers had to respond by 
indicating the degree to which they agreed with the 
respective statement. The answer categories ranged from 1 
(low willingness) to 5 (strong willingness). As an 
indication of a respondents' overall willingness to 
contribute to collective irrigation infrastructure 
management, the average of the values from the four 
statements was taken. As Section 3.1.2 shows, nearly three 
quarters of the respondents showed a rather high 
willingness to participate in irrigation infrastructure 
management. 
 
Table 2 Statements regarding respondents' willingness to contribute to collective 
irrigation infrastructure management. 
 Items 
1 
I am willing to participate in collective irrigation infrastructure 
management. 
2 
I think collective irrigation infrastructure management is my own 
business.  
3 
I am willing to donate my money, labor, supplies or anything else 
to participate in collective irrigation infrastructure management.  
4 
I will inform and invite other village members to participate in 
collective irrigation infrastructure management.  
 
The independent variables were lineage identity (X1) 
and strength of lineage network ties (X2). To measure 
lineage identity (X1), the organizational identity scale was 
used (see Tab. 3). If the score was higher, the respondent's 
lineage organizational identity was higher. The internal 
consistency coefficient of the scale was Cronbach's Alpha 
= 0.929. There was a moderate correlation among the items, 
and each item was significantly correlated with the total 
score of the questionnaire, indicating that the questionnaire 
has a good reliability and validity, and can accurately 
measure participants' lineage organizational identity. 
Table 3 Lineage identity scale. 
Items 
1 When someone criticizes my lineage, it is like a personal insult. 
2 I am very interested in what others think about my lineage. 
3 
When I talk about this lineage, I usually say "we" rather than 
"they". 
4 This lineage's successes are my successes. 
5 
When someone praises this lineage, it feels like a personal 
compliment 
6 
If a report in the media criticized the lineage, I would feel 
embarrassed. 
 
The strength of the lineage network ties (X2) was 
measured with two indicators. First, whether or not the 
lineage had an ancestral temple [20], and second, whether 
it had a genealogy [21]. Ancestral temples are the place for 
lineages to worship and sacrifice, and genealogies are the 
records of descent of a clan, which have been widely used 
to indicate the strength of lineage network ties [20]. 
Respondents were accordingly asked, "Is there any 
ancestral temple or genealogy of your household". The 
answer categories were as follows, "neither with an 
ancestral temple nor a genealogy", "with an ancestral 
temple", "with a genealogy", or "both". In the data analysis, 
"0" means "none", "1" means with an ancestral temple or 
with a genealogy, and "2" means both. 
 
3.3 Control Variables 
 
In order to observe the effect of independent variables 
X1 and X2, this article controls for some other variables 
which may also have an effect on Y1 and Y2. These variables 
were first about the household head, i.e. the education level 
of the household head (X3). Further control variables were 
the period of living in the village (X4); the kind of Hukou 
(X5); the number of household members who have out-
migrated for work (X6); the number of household labor 
engaged in agricultural production (X7); agriculture land 
area (X8); relationship with villagers (X9); agricultural 
income (X10); total income (X11). The definitions of all the 




Table 4 Variable definitions and description. 
Variables definitions Index Variables definitions Index 
Participation in collective irrigation 
infrastructure management in the past 
year (Y1)  
Yes = 1, no = 0 Hukou (x5) Hukou of urban = 1, Hukou of rural = 0 
Willingness to participate in collective 
irrigation infrastructure management (Y2)  
Average continuous variable 
value on a five-point scale 
Household labor out-
migrated (x6) 
Reported value of the respondent (number 
of people) 
Lineage identity (X1) See Tab. 3 
Household labor engaged in 
agricultural production (x7) 
Reported value of the respondent (number 
of people) 
Strength of lineage network (X2) 
None = 0; with ancestral temple 
or genealogy = 1; both = 2 
Agricultural land area (x8) Reported value of the respondent (mu). 
Education level of the household head (x3) 
Primary school and below = 
1;junior-/middle-/high- school = 
2; technical secondary/high 
school = 3;college = 4; 
Masters/PhD = 5 
Relationship with villagers 
(x9) 
Good, very harmonious = 5;good = 4; 
neither good nor bad = 3; poor, not very 
good = 2, very poor, large frictions, 
hostility = 1 
Period of living in the village (x4) 
Reported value of the respondent 
(years) 
Agricultural income (x10) 
Reported value of the respondent (RMB): 
1 = less than 10,000; 2 = 10,000 – 30,000; 
3 = 30,000 – 50,000; 4 = 50,000 – 70,000; 
5 = 70,000 – 100,000; 6 ≥ 100, 000 
4 RESULTS 
 
This article established six regression models (see Tab. 
5). In Model 1 to Model 3, the dependent variable was 
lineage members' participation in collective irrigation 
infrastructure management (Y1). In Model 4 to Model 6, the 
dependent variable was the willingness to participate in 
collective irrigation infrastructure management (Y2). 
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Logistic and Tobit regressions were carried out using 
Stata 14.0. Y1 was defined as a categorical variable (with 
values of 0 and 1), so Model 1 to Model 3 are the logistic 
regression models. Y2 was defined as a continuous variable, 
because the average of the values from the four underlying 
statements (see Tab. 2) was used as an indication of 
respondents' willingness. Model 4 to Model 6 were 
accordingly analyzed using Tobit regression.
 




model 1 (Y1)  
Logistic  
model 2 (Y1) 
Logistic  
model 3 (Y1) 
Tobit  
Model 4 (Y2) 
Tobit  
model 5 (Y2) 
Tobit  
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Sample size 548 548 548 548 548 548 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; p - values are shown with stars, *p < 0.05,**p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
As can be seen from Tab. 5, for the case of the 
collective management of an irrigation infrastructure, 
lineage becomes important in its characteristic as a social 
network as well as for a hierarchically organized clan. For 
respondents' willingness to contribute to collective 
irrigation management, identification with the clan is more 
likely to motivate reported willingness than network 
strength (see Model 4 and Model 5, respectively). In 
addition, Model 6 shows that when this article put X1 and 
X2 together to regress only lineage organizational identity, 
X1 has a significant impact on Y2. The growth in 
respondents' willingness contributes to irrigation 
infrastructure management, which is moderate. For de 
facto participation, the influence of lineage is even stronger, 
independent of whether it takes effect as a network (Model 
1) or organization (Model 2). 
Another variable that is significant for both dependent 
variables is agricultural income. The more economically 
dependent a household is on agriculture, the more likely it 
contributes to infrastructure management, and the more 
likely it expresses its willingness to contribute. While 
contribution to irrigation infrastructure management is not 
correlated with the size of agricultural land, household 
heads who have more land are very likely to express a 
higher willingness to contribute. This correlation may be 
understood as a socially desirable answer, given the fact 





In the context of weakening formal institutions in the 
countryside, this paper looked at the role of lineage 
informal institutions in facilitating collective irrigation 
infrastructure management. Lineage can facilitate public 
goods provision through collective action, or by making 
lineage members accountable. This article builds on this 
literature by asking what exactly within lineage triggers 
farmers' willingness to participate in collective action, 
whether lineage is used as a social network or an 
organization. 
The analysis incorporated a variety of factors that were 
presumed to have an influence on farmers' contribution or 
stated willingness to contribute to collective irrigation 
infrastructure management. In addition, even if factors like 
agricultural income or agricultural land area positively 
influence respondents' contribution, lineage has the most 
significant influence. 
Based on data from empirical research in Sichuan 
Province, and using logistic models and tobit models, this 
article hence found that both lineage as an organization and 
lineage as a social network influence farmers' contribution 
to collective irrigation infrastructure management. 
Identification with the clan, however, is more important for 
farmers' expressed willingness, which contributes to 
irrigation infrastructure management. This finding is 
supported by the literature on social and organizational 
identity, separately, which show identification with an 
organization (or group) as enabling a commitment to an 
organization and its activities. 
Based on these findings, this article concludes that the 
current conceptual divide into lineage as a network and an 
organization or a patriarchal clan system may need to be 
reconsidered. This article shows that research might be 
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able to capture lineage more realistically if both 
understandings are employed. In the case at hand, the 
strength of the ties within the community of clan members, 
as well as the "chain of command", have their influence on 
lineage members' contribution to irrigation infrastructure 
management. However, for other areas of issue, either 
lineage's network structure or its hierarchical organization 
may be more important, and to better understand the 
working of lineage, more research is needed on the 
conditions under which both of them take effect. The 
example of lineage as a mediator of jobs may, however, 
also show some of the limits of lineage for the provision of 
public goods. Public goods are fundamental for a society. 
While the results show that lineage can motivate lineage 
members to take over tasks in irrigation infrastructure 
management, the question arises as to how far reliance on 
lineage can also lead to the exclusion of non-clan members 
from the provision of public goods. This method is suitable 
for measuring the influence of organization identity. Only 
some aspects regarding the strength of social networks on 
collective action have been considered for informal 
institutions. More research needs to be done on the 
conditions under which the involvement of lineage in the 
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